Tokugawa Ieyasu (Jap. 徳川家康, 1543–1616) was the last of the three great unifiers of Japan and founder of the Tokugawa shogunate, which brought Japan 250 years of peace. After decades as a hostage, vassal and patient strategist, he defeated his rivals at the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600 and destroyed the Toyotomi family in the sieges of Osaka in 1614/15. His political system – the Bakuhan system with the famous Sankin Kōtai (compulsory residence of the lords in Edo) – shaped Japan until the Meiji Restoration in 1868.

The Patience of the Hunter: Ieyasu’s Early Years
21 October 1600. Fog lay over the plain of Sekigahara. In the command tent of the Eastern Army sat a man who had waited 57 years of his life for this moment. Tokugawa Ieyasu, who had grown up as a hostage and had served under Nobunaga and Hideyoshi for decades, knew: this was his last chance.
The famous saying about the three unifiers sums it up. “What do you do if the cuckoo does not sing?” Oda Nobunaga answers: “I kill it.” Hideyoshi says: “I make it sing.” Ieyasu is silent for a moment, then: “I wait until it sings.”
A Childhood as a Hostage
Born in 1543 in Mikawa Province, Ieyasu was the child of a small warrior family that was in danger of being ground down between powerful neighbours. At the age of five he was taken hostage by the Oda – then, a year later, handed on to the Imagawa clan. The Matsudaira were a pawn between two great powers, and their heir was the currency. Until his coming-of-age ceremony in 1556 he spent his entire youth in Sunpu, far from home, surrounded by strangers who watched his every step. He studied the classics, trained with the sword, observed the politics of the court.
The Alliance with the Demon King
1560 changed everything. At the Battle of Okehazama, Oda Nobunaga defeated the Imagawa army in a daring surprise attack. Imagawa Yoshimoto, Ieyasu’s liege lord, was beheaded. Ieyasu – who had returned to Mikawa in 1556 and had led campaigns as an Imagawa vassal – immediately exploited the power vacuum.
He returned to Okazaki Castle, consolidated control over his home province and concluded an alliance with Nobunaga – the son of the very Oda Nobuhide who had once been responsible for taking the young Ieyasu hostage. The alliance lasted 22 years. When Nobunaga died in the burning Honnō-ji temple in 1582, Ieyasu controlled eight provinces and had learned how to survive when geniuses fail.
Under Hideyoshi: The Loyal Vassal
Toyotomi Hideyoshi was faster. Within 13 days of Nobunaga’s death he had defeated the traitor Akechi Mitsuhide and taken control.
Ieyasu, who had arrived too late to fight, faced a choice: wage war against Hideyoshi or submit. In 1584 he chose war – and won. At Komaki and Nagakute he beat Hideyoshi’s army in one of the few battles Hideyoshi ever lost. But Ieyasu was clever enough not to turn a tactical victory into a strategic catastrophe. He submitted politically, but kept his lands and his army. The message was clear: Ieyasu was not an enemy who could be eliminated cheaply.
He waited. For 14 years he served the former peasant’s son as an ally, fought in his battles, attended his court, smiled at his feasts. In 1590 Hideyoshi rewarded him with Kantō, the richest region in Japan – and at the same time removed him from the political centre, Kyoto. Ieyasu saw through the manoeuvre, accepted it and systematically expanded his power. He founded Edo – later Tokyo – as his capital.
When Hideyoshi died in 1598, leaving behind his five-year-old son Hideyori, Ieyasu was 56 years old. He was the richest, most experienced and most patient of the five regents whom Hideyoshi had appointed to protect the boy. The question was not whether, but when.
Sekigahara 1600: The Decisive Battle
The fog lifted shortly after eight o’clock in the morning. Ishida Mitsunari, the leader of the Western Army, saw his chance. He had the better position – his 80,000 men held the hills around the plain of Sekigahara. Ieyasu’s 75,000 warriors of the Eastern Army were trapped, hemmed in between mountains and marshy ground.
Mitsunari gave the signal. Arquebusiers opened fire. Ashigaru spearmen charged down the slopes. The fighting was brutal, chaotic, desperate.
For three hours the battle raged without a clear victor. Then, around midday, something happened that was to determine the history of Japan for the next 250 years.
The Betrayal of Kobayakawa
Kobayakawa Hideaki sat on Mount Matsuo with 15,000 men and did – nothing. He was officially part of the Western Army, but Ieyasu had made him an offer: change sides, and I will give you one of the richest provinces in Japan.
Hideaki hesitated. He was young, inexperienced, torn between honour and greed. Ieyasu lost patience. He ordered his arquebusiers to fire on Hideaki’s positions – not to kill, but as a warning. The message was clear: decide now, or you are the next enemy.
Around midday, Hideaki’s army charged down the hill – not against Ieyasu, but against Mitsunari’s flank. The betrayal broke the Western Army. Within two hours the battle was decided. Mitsunari fled, was captured three days later and beheaded in Kyoto. 30,000 warriors lay dead on the battlefield.
The Purge
Ieyasu was too old for generosity. The leaders of the Western Army were executed – not quickly and honourably through seppuku, but publicly, by the executioner. Their heads were put on display. Their families dispossessed. 87 daimyō lost their fiefs.
Ieyasu filled the gaps with his own men: the Fudai daimyō, vassals who had already served him before Sekigahara. They received the strategically most important provinces – passes, ports, roads to Kyoto.
The former enemies, the Tozama daimyō, were banished to the periphery: Kyūshū, Tōhoku, Shikoku. Far enough away to pose no threat.

Osaka 1614–1615: The Annihilation of a Dynasty
Toyotomi Hideyori was 22 years old and lived in the largest castle in Japan. His father Hideyoshi had built Osaka as an impregnable fortress: five storeys, massive stone walls, three concentric moats. 100,000 rōnin – masterless samurai who had lost their lords after Sekigahara – had gathered in the castle. They hoped for a chance of revenge.
Ieyasu, now 71 years old and officially retired, waited for a pretext. In the winter of 1614 he got it: an inscription on a temple bell that Hideyori had donated could be interpreted as an insult.
The Winter Campaign: The Moats
200,000 Tokugawa soldiers surrounded Osaka. They attempted an assault. The defenders drove them back. 100 dead with every attempt. The castle was exactly what Hideyoshi had promised: impregnable. Ieyasu changed his strategy. He brought in artillery. European cannon that he had bought from Dutch traders began to shoot the inner buildings of the castle to pieces. One cannonball killed two of Hideyori’s concubines. The young lord’s mother, Yodogimi, broke down. She urged her son to negotiate.
Ieyasu offered peace – on one condition: the outer moats had to be filled in. Hideyori agreed. The ceasefire was signed. Then Ieyasu filled in not only the outer moats, but the inner ones too. When Hideyori’s advisers protested, it was too late. The impregnable fortress was now just a large castle.
The Summer Campaign: The End
In May 1615 war broke out again. This time Osaka had no moats. The Tokugawa army stormed the castle, section by section, storey by storey. On 4 June fire broke out – probably set deliberately. The flames devoured the wooden structures. Hideyori and Yodogimi committed seppuku in the burning ruins.
Ieyasu had Hideyori’s eight-year-old son executed. The Toyotomi line was extinguished. Of the greatest dynasty of the Sengoku period nothing remained but ashes and memory.
Pax Tokugawa: The System That Lasted 250 Years
Ieyasu died in 1616, one year after Osaka. His system outlived him by two centuries. How did one man manage what Nobunaga and Hideyoshi had failed to achieve?
The Bakuhan System
The shōgunate controlled foreign policy, coinage and ideology. The daimyō – 260 of them – retained autonomy over their provinces (han). They levied taxes, administered justice, managed their samurai.
But Ieyasu built in control mechanisms. The most important: Sankin Kōtai (alternate attendance). Every daimyō had to spend every other year in Edo. His wife and his heir remained there permanently – as hostages. The costs were astronomical: journeys with hundreds of retainers, double households, magnificent residences in Edo. A great daimyō spent up to 70% of his income on Sankin Kōtai.
It worked. The daimyō were too busy and too poor to rebel.
Heinō Bunri: The Separation of the Estates
Hideyoshi had begun to separate warriors and peasants. Ieyasu completed the process. Samurai lived in castle towns (jōkamachi), were paid in rice (kokudaka system) and were not allowed to become peasants. Peasants remained on the land, paid taxes and were not allowed to carry weapons. Society froze. Mobility ended. But peace began.
For 250 years no major battle was fought on Japanese soil. The samurai became officials. They studied Confucianism, kept records, administered taxes. The sword became a symbol, not a tool.
This transformation – from warrior to bureaucrat – is one of the strangest phenomena in Japanese history, which the sociologist Eiko Ikegami has described as the “taming of the samurai”.
The End: Why the System Broke Down
The irony: the system that Ieyasu created to secure peace made Japan incapable of adapting. When Commodore Perry appeared in Edo Bay in 1853 with his “black ships”, the facade crumbled. The samurai, who had not fought for 250 years, were no longer warriors. The shōgunate, which had built on isolation, could not negotiate.
In 1868 the Meiji Restoration overthrew the Tokugawa regime. The samurai class was abolished. The castle in Edo became the imperial palace.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Wissen articles update with images + English version
The famous cuckoo saying sums it up: while Nobunaga kills the bird that does not sing and Hideyoshi makes it sing, Ieyasu waits until the bird sings of its own accord. Ieyasu served 22 years under Nobunaga and more than a decade under Hideyoshi without ever openly rebelling – apart from his military victory at Komaki in 1584, which he cleverly converted into political submission. He waited until both were dead before taking power. This patience – combined with the systematic building of his own power base in Kantō – was his greatest advantage.
2. How was Ieyasu able to win at Sekigahara, even though the Western Army was numerically superior and better positioned?
The key was Kobayakawa Hideaki’s betrayal. Hideaki commanded 15,000 men of the Western Army, but hesitated during the battle. Ieyasu had his positions fired upon – as a warning to make up his mind. Hideaki thereupon changed sides and attacked Mitsunari’s flank, which caused the Western Army to collapse within two hours.
3. Why did it take 15 years from Sekigahara (1600) to the annihilation of the Toyotomi (1615)?
Ieyasu first had to consolidate his shōgunate. After Sekigahara he was the de facto ruler, but Hideyori was still alive and had legitimacy as Hideyoshi’s son. Ieyasu systematically dispossessed Tozama daimyō, built up the Sankin-Kōtai system and waited for the right moment. Only when Hideyori came of age and 100,000 rōnin gathered in Osaka did Ieyasu have the pretext he needed. The attack on Osaka was not panic – it was the final planned step.
4. What was Sankin Kōtai, and why did it work so well?
Sankin Kōtai (“alternate attendance”) forced every daimyō to spend every other year in Edo, while his wife and heir remained there permanently – in effect as hostages. The costs (journeys with hundreds of retainers, double households) swallowed up to 70% of the income of great daimyō. This made rebellions financially impossible, but at the same time promoted road building, inns (honjin) and cultural exchange between the provinces.
5. Why did the Pax Tokugawa end in 1868 if the system was so stable?
The system was built for a closed world. When Commodore Perry appeared in 1853 with Western warships, its weakness became apparent: 250 years of peace had turned the samurai into officials, incapable of fighting. The shōgunate was unable to respond adequately, either militarily or diplomatically. The lower samurai (shizoku), frustrated at their powerlessness, joined forces with reform-minded daimyō and overthrew the Tokugawa regime in favour of the Meiji Restoration.
Conclusion: The Price of Peace
Tokugawa Ieyasu was not a hero. He was a survivor who learned from the mistakes of Nobunaga (too brutal) and Hideyoshi (too ambitious). His system – Bakuhan, Sankin Kōtai, Heinō Bunri – created 250 years of peace, but also 250 years of stagnation. The question that his rule raises remains relevant: is an authoritarian system that guarantees peace better than an open one that risks war.
Further Articles
- Oda Nobunaga: The Demon King – The first of the three unifiers and Ieyasu’s long-standing ally
- Toyotomi Hideyoshi: From Peasant to Ruler – The second unifier, whom Ieyasu served for more than a decade
- The Sengoku Period: Japan’s Age of Warring States – The era that shaped Ieyasu
- Bushido: The Way of the Warrior – How the warrior ethos was reinvented under the Tokugawa
- Japanese Castles: Architecture of Power – From Osaka to Edo – the fortresses of the unifiers
- The Katana: Myth, Reality and the Soul of the Samurai – How the sword became a symbol in the Edo period
Visit the Samurai Museum Berlin
Over 500 original objects from feudal Japan — armour, weapons — await you at Auguststraße 68, Berlin-Mitte. Open daily from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m.
Related Articles
- Samurai: History, Culture and Legacy
- Bushido: The Samurai Code of Honour
- The Katana: Myth and Reality
Bibliography
- Hall, John Whitney (ed.) (1991): The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 4–8.
- Ikegami, Eiko (1995): The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan. Harvard University Press. Ch. 7–10.
- Jansen, Marius B. (ed.) (1989): The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1–2.
- Friday, Karl F. (2004): Samurai, Warfare and the State in Early Medieval Japan. Routledge. Ch. 6.
- Turnbull, Stephen (2022): War in Japan 1467–1615. Osprey Publishing. pp. 115–125.
Museum Catalogue
- Samurai Museum Berlin: exhibit data C07V (Honda Masashige, Wakisaka clan), C08V (Tokugawa regime), C09V (Iwai Takayuki), C10V (Three unifiers), C25V (Kaga fief). Curatorial texts: M. Lesniewska, K. Ogorek.
© Samurai Museum Berlin – All rights reserved